BRICS Summit: A Reality Check on What Each Member Wants

The BRICS summit is upon us, and while the acronym — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa — is widely recognised, the grouping's inner workings remain opaque to most. Its closing declarations tend to be lengthy and short on concrete action. Yet the global disorder triggered by US tariff measures and compounded by two ongoing wars has sharpened interest in what BRICS can actually deliver, particularly for a fragile world economy.

Origins and expansion

BRICS took shape against the backdrop of the 2008 financial crisis, with an early focus on market volatility, energy and reform of the global financial system. At the first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia's then-president Dmitry Medvedev criticised dollar dominance and emphasised the centrality of the G-20. By then Moscow had already been excluded from the G-8, and China had overtaken the US as the largest trading partner. India's economy was under severe strain, with GDP growth falling from 8.4% to a projected 5.6%. South Africa joined a year later.

The New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement followed. The bank was designed to finance infrastructure and sustainable development, including in non-member developing economies — Bangladesh was an early beneficiary of its flexible terms. The CRA was intended to provide mutual support during currency crises, which in turn led to discussions on local-currency use. Expansion accelerated in 2024 with Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia joining, and Indonesia following last year. Riyadh, however, is listed as a member but does not describe itself as one. Around ten countries are waiting in the wings for full membership.

Russia's stake

Russia's motivations are straightforward. Long caught between its self-image as part of Europe and its broader Eurasian ties, Moscow's position worsened after the 2014 Crimea annexation and the Ukraine war, which brought increasingly destructive sanctions. Russia's trade with BRICS countries exceeds $330 billion — roughly 35% to 40% of its total global trade — and about 90% of that is conducted in national currencies. Much of it is with China and India, though Brazil's trade doubled last year.

For Moscow, BRICS offers something less tangible but equally important: President Vladimir Putin is received as an honoured guest across member states, and the grouping has brought in Belarus, Cuba and Kazakhstan as partners. China has provided vital support in the Ukraine conflict, most recently 46 tonnes of a chemical material used to produce carbon fibre, essential for lightweight drone airframes. India faces accusations of buying oil and supporting the war, even as European imports of Russian gas have risen. South Africa serves as a lynchpin for Russian engagement in Africa, reflected in the abstentions of several countries there on UN resolutions against Russia.

Yet BRICS was not designed to shelter Moscow from isolation; its original purpose was to jointly challenge a skewed international financial and governance system. That system is skewed partly because of Russia's actions in Ukraine. The grouping cannot resolve this unless Moscow ends the war — a point underscored by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's call in Bishkek and the Indian foreign minister's visit to Ukraine.

China's calculus

For Beijing, BRICS enhances its international standing as the grouping's most powerful member. A UN report notes that while intra-BRICS trade has grown rapidly on the back of complementarities in natural resources, manufacturing and technology, China is the main driver, with India to a lesser extent. Beijing is also the least dependent on BRICS for trade. Policy-level constraints continue to limit the bloc's full potential — Indian traders, for instance, face non-tariff barriers and selectively applied regulatory mechanisms in the Chinese market.

On UN reform, China calls India an important power but does not directly back the candidatures of India or South Africa. Local politics, rather than grand reform, tends to prevail. BRICS members push back against unilateralism at the WTO, but their agendas on agriculture differ. Crucially, China remains the US's largest trading partner, with a $202 billion trade deficit and some $760 billion in US bonds. A $33 billion US trade surplus in services with China further limits Washington's leverage. Unlike other members, China has room to manoeuvre in the face of US hostility towards BRICS.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE

For Riyadh, BRICS originally offered an escape from the petrodollar system and a source of weapons it was denied. The petrodollar arrangement, rooted in a 1974 unwritten agreement, had Riyadh pay for oil in dollars and recycle them into the US in exchange for American weapons and security. That began to fray when Washington refused to supply missiles during the Iran-Iraq war; Beijing stepped in. With the Mecca Pact encouraged by President Donald Trump, security appears less of a US priority. As the US became a major energy exporter, China replaced it as the largest oil importer, investing $35 billion in infrastructure projects tied to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Vision 2030. Digital payment systems and local-currency settlement further appeal to Riyadh.

Yet Saudi Arabia does not list itself as a BRICS member and typically sends its foreign minister rather than its head of state. This positive neutrality allows it to participate without committing, while preserving its US relationship. Saudi money is spread across BRICS economies: $10 billion in India with a promised $100 billion; a recent deal with Brazil on mineral resources and technical exchange; investments in South Africa's infrastructure, energy and corporate sectors; and 13 strategic agreements with Russia worth about $1.4 billion signed in June. These are balanced against a recent $5 billion US arms clearance, adding to $142 billion last year, alongside a Saudi pledge to invest $600 billion in the US. Even a combined BRICS comes nowhere near Riyadh's investments in the US and Europe — but it offers alternatives.

The UAE's position remains less defined in the available material, but its membership alongside Saudi Arabia signals the Gulf's growing interest in hedging between traditional partners and emerging alternatives.