IAEA: Syria's Assad-Era Reactor Was Built for Weapons-Grade Plutonium

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has concluded that a nuclear reactor under construction in Syria during the rule of Bashar Assad was configured to produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons, the agency's director general said on Monday.

Speaking at the start of a regular meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, Rafael Grossi said the reactor's design and technical features were "very efficient in the production of fissile material that could be directly used for the fabrication of nuclear weapons."

"Of course, that was never declared, that was always denied," Grossi told reporters. "Intentions cannot be judged, but that was a very serious proliferation concern."

Syria was long suspected of running an extensive undeclared nuclear program under Assad, including a reactor built with North Korean assistance in the eastern Deir el-Zour province. Following Assad's ouster, the new government agreed to allow IAEA inspectors access to suspected nuclear sites.

During an August visit, inspectors confirmed that newly uncovered cooling infrastructure at one location was consistent with a nuclear reactor. They also examined a previously undeclared site that Syria had notified the agency about in a July 17 letter.

At that site, the IAEA verified the presence of approximately 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal in the form of fuel rods with cladding. Grossi described the inspection as difficult, saying inspectors had to "tear down walls" and navigate "very narrow passages" to reach material that had been hidden among scattered boxes.

The material is now under IAEA safeguards, with cameras installed at the location. Grossi said the question of whether the uranium remains in Syria or is moved elsewhere is a decision for the Syrian government, adding that what matters is that the agency knows the material's location "until the last gram."

Natural uranium metal is not directly usable in a weapon, but experts note it could be diverted to a covert program to produce plutonium. Logan Mintz of the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative said that once deemed safe to move, the material could be transported in certified containers to a third country for conversion into a more stable form suitable for civilian nuclear power use, with robust security required throughout any such transfer.