Beyond the Collision: What Navies Owe the Sea, Not Just Each Other

A Pakistani warship grazed past an Indian Navy vessel in the Arabian Sea, an incident that led India to summon Pakistan's Charge d'Affaires. The episode has been widely framed as another chapter in a long-running rivalry, but that framing obscures a more practical question: what does a navy owe the sea and the people on it, regardless of who it faces?

A warship's responsibilities extend beyond combat readiness. It must navigate safely, keep its manoeuvres predictable, honour confidence-building arrangements its country has signed, and assist strangers in distress irrespective of their flag. Measured against that fuller standard, the conduct of India's and Pakistan's navies in shared waters becomes less a story about rivalry and more one about professionalism.

The precedent often cited is the 2011 encounter between INS Godavari and PNS Babur in the Gulf of Aden. India's account held that Babur closed dangerously on Godavari and violated navigational safety rules, including Article 10 of the 1991 bilateral agreement. Pakistan maintained that Godavari had interfered with a Pakistani humanitarian operation involving the hijacked MV Suez, and that the dangerous manoeuvring came from the other side.

Article 10 exists precisely because the two navies are expected to keep disagreeing strategically. The rule requiring naval vessels and submarines to maintain a minimum distance of three nautical miles is designed to reduce the odds of an accident. Distance buys time — to identify the other ship's intent, to radio a warning, to correct course. Close that distance suddenly and that time vanishes, a genuinely dangerous prospect between two nuclear-armed states.

It would be easy to turn one bad manoeuvre into a claim that Pakistan disregards maritime treaties. The record does not support that. Pakistan ratified UNCLOS in 1997 and has incorporated major IMO instruments — including SOLAS-related conventions and STCW — into domestic law. A sweeping charge of treaty rejection is both harder to prove and the wrong accusation. The narrower, more serious question is whether the Pakistani vessel involved held a safe speed, kept a safe distance, answered warnings, and adhered to the bilateral mechanism Islamabad signed.

India's record in the same waters offers a counterpoint. In January 2024, INS Sumitra rescued 36 people — 19 of them Pakistanis — from two hijacked fishing vessels in under 36 hours. Seven weeks later, INS Kolkata led the operation against the hijacked bulk carrier MV Ruen, with surveillance aircraft, warships and MARCOS commandos securing the surrender of all 35 pirates and the safe return of 17 crew still aboard; one injured crew member had earlier been evacuated by INS Kochi. In April 2025, INS Trikand's medical team boarded a fishing vessel in the central Arabian Sea to treat a badly injured Pakistani sailor before the boat continued on its way.

Different missions, same habit: an Indian warship treating a person in danger as the priority, ahead of the passport they carry.