Saudi Arabia Looks to China as Houthi Strikes Expose Limits of US Shield
Houthi attacks have shut the East-West Petroline and hit Riyadh, prompting Saudi Arabia to look beyond Washington to China, whose ties with Iran give it leverage.
A Defence Shield Under Strain
As Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia intensified this month, the Kingdom first turned to the United States, its security guarantor for decades, and then to China. The strikes mark an escalation in both reach and intent: they have hit critical energy infrastructure and, in an unprecedented move, reached the Saudi capital, Riyadh.
The East-West Petroline, the main artery for Saudi oil exports since the Strait of Hormuz was closed, is now shut. The Houthis have also been expanding their hold on Yemeni territory, including much of the Red Sea coast, giving them control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a chokepoint through which roughly a tenth of global maritime traffic passes. Their push towards the Kaboub mountains would add a strategic vantage point over the Red Sea coast.
The Mecca Pact and a US U-Turn
The Mecca Pact, signed in Islam's holiest city to protect the Kingdom from such attacks, has produced only condemnations. US President Donald Trump, after reportedly agreeing to strike the Houthis, reversed course and opted for talks with the group instead. The stated reason was overstretched American troops amid the war in Iran, though other considerations — freeing up crude supply, and nudging the Saudis towards Israel — are also seen as factors. Riyadh has so far avoided that course.
Why China Fits
Turning to China would extend a defence diversification policy that began after the Arab Spring, when Gulf monarchies felt threatened by regional upheaval and perceived indifference from the Obama administration. China is deeply invested in the Kingdom: bilateral trade exceeds USD 108 billion a year, making each the other's largest trading partner in their respective contexts. Chinese infrastructure investment in Saudi Arabia totals USD 53.85 billion, and Beijing has aligned its Belt and Road Initiative with Vision 2030.
China also values ties with Riyadh for its standing in the Muslim world, including support on Xinjiang and the one-China policy. At the same time, it is Iran's main market for sanctioned crude, with official bilateral trade of about USD 9.96 billion in 2025, believed to omit over USD 31 billion in unreported oil exports.
China-Saudi defence ties have grown, with joint naval exercises since 2019, and US intelligence has alleged Beijing is helping Riyadh manufacture ballistic missiles. Beijing's heavy stakes on both sides of the Gulf prompted its 2023 mediation that restored Saudi-Iranian diplomatic ties, and its ties with Tehran helped Chinese shipping avoid Houthi attacks in the Red Sea after the 2023 Gaza war.
Leverage, Not Troops
China is unlikely to intervene militarily, but its leverage over Iran is what Riyadh hopes to use. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's recent visit to Beijing is seen as an outcome of Saudi appeals, and reports citing Iranian sources say Beijing has asked Tehran to rein in the Houthis. A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement said China does not wish to see regional tensions spill further into Yemen and the Red Sea, called for an end to actions that complicate the situation, and urged dialogue.
China is also heavily invested in the Yanbu port project on the Red Sea, through which the Petroline was exporting oil after the Hormuz closure. Yanbu is the world's third-largest refining hub and home to a major liquid handling terminal, with SINOPEC a major stakeholder in its refinery — assets within range of Houthi drones and missiles.
For Riyadh, the appeal is also about signalling that it has options beyond Washington and the Mecca Pact. The war, in Saudi eyes, has dispelled the myth of the American guarantee.